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Summary findings
Fleming,  Chu,  and  Bakker  compare  the banking  crises  In the early  stages the  three  private  banking  systems
experienced  in Estonia,  Latvia,  and Lithuania,  examining  were  similar  and  grew  rapidly.  All three  have  had  liberal
the  causes,  effects,  and  policy  responses.  policies  toward  licensing  new  commercial  banks,
The  starting  point  for the  three  'banking  systems  was  believing  that  more  banks would  generate  the
the  same: They  inherited  the  monobank  system of the  competition  needed  to drive  down  deposit  and  lending
former  Soviet  Union,  wvith  specialized  state  banks  serving  rates,  and  provide  the capital  needed  to support  the
specific  branches  of the  econonmy. They  quickly  emerging  private  sector.  Many  new private  banks  were
established  a central  bank  at the  core of their  banking  established  by enterprises  that  wanted  access  to cheaper
system. They  were  weak  in bank  management  and lacked  funding  than  was available  from  other  banks.  Little
staffs with  modern  banking  skills, and no system had  an  thought  was given at first  to the  implications  of this
appropriate  legal, regulatory,  or  supervisory  framework  policy  for banking  safety  and supervision.
governing  the  banks. In some  Oistances fraud  and  The  conclusions  drawn  by Fleming,  Chu,  and  Bakker
corruption  prevailed,  encouraged  by the relatively  (in brief,  below)  may have  implications  for  banking
permissive  regulatory  andl sup  rvisory  environment  for  reform  in the other  former  Soviet  republics,  especially
banks that  existed  in the Baltics. All had to decide  what to  the smaller  ones:
do with the remnants  of the Soviet banking  s:stem  at  the  *  Some  banking  distress  is inevitable.
same time that  they  encouragecd the growth  of the new  *  Banking  distress  may  be desirable.
private  banking  sector.  eBanking  crises  die down  relatively  quickly.
Estonia  and  Lithuania  reconstituted  the  specialized  *  When  crises  arise,  authorities  should  respond  firmly
Soviet  banks  as national  state  banks  and  began  to  and  promptly.
privatize  them.  In some  instances  the  state  retains  an  *  Corruption  and  weakness  should  never  be
ownership  stake.  In Lithuanii  the state  may  increase  its  rewarded.
ownership  share  as part  of  a rescue  effort  for  some  *  Banking  crises should  be  prepared  for.
former  state  banks.  Larvia,  by contrasit,  econstituited  the  *  Supervisors  should  send  strong  signals to bankers
savings  bank,  then  privatized  branc:hes  of tlie  remaining  abotut appropriate  banking  behavior.
banks.  The  residual  branchcs  wvefrez  merged  into  one
bank,  rehabilitated,  and theln subject  to formal
privatization.  The  savings bank  Is n(ow being  privatized.
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2THE BALTICS--BANKING CRISES OBSERVED
1.  INTRODUCTION
1.1  The  Baltic  Republics  of  Estonia,  Latvia  and  Lithuania  are  in  the  vanguard  of
transition  in  the  Former  Soviet  Union  (FSU)  and  have  made  significant  steps  towards  a
market-based economy over  the past five years.  The first fruits of their reform programs are
now being felt  in the  form of a  revival  in positive  real economic growth.  But  there  are a
number of factors that have threatened to derail the fledgling recovery.  The most surprising of
these,  perhaps,  is that  all  three  of  these republics  have experienced  serious  crises  banking
which have set  in train significant structural changes in their banking systems,  and,  in  some
instances  adverse  political  and  economic  repercussions.  The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to
compare  and  contrast  the  banking  crises  experiences  of  the  three  Baltic  Republics  by
examining their causes,  their effects and the policy response of the three sets of Authorities.
By drawing out the lessons of experience,  it is hoped to show how the worst manifestations of
banking crises can be avoided in other transitional economies.
-I.  THE STARTING POINTS 2
2.1  The  starting point for  the  evolution  of  the  banking  systems  in  all  three  of  the
Baltic Republics  was the  same.  Specifically,  all three Republics  inherited  the monobank
system  of  the FSU with specialized state banks  servicing  specific branches of  the  economy.
All  three quickly  established a Central Bank  at the core of  their  banking  system.  None  of
the three possessed  a human  resource base skilled  in  modern banking  practices  and  none
had an appropriate legal, regulatory,  and supervisory framework  governing  the banks.  The
three  republics  had,  at  the  outset,  to  decide  what  to  do  with  their  remnant  of  the  FSU
banking  system.  At the same time, they had the twin challenges  of encouraging  the growth
of  the  new private  banking  sector  while  ensuring  that  such  growth  took place  within  the
bounds of prudential norms.
2.2  In their initial responses to the problems  of the remnant  of  the inherited  banking
systems the similarities among  the three republics,  to some extent,  end.  The Estonian  and
Lithuanian  approaches  were  similar  in  that  both  republics  reconstituted  the  specialized
Soviet banks as national state banks and gradually/partially privatized them by selling shares
to  the  local private  sector.  The  Latvian  approach,  in  contrast,  was  to  reconstitute  the
Savings Bank,  but then privatize  the branches  of the remaining  banks.  The residual banks
were merged and rehabilitated, then subject to a formal  privatization process.
Text in bold typeface  provides  a comparative  perspective  on the  developnmenlt  of the cr  ises  in the three  counilties.
32.3  All three of the Baltic Republics have had extremely liberal policies toward the
licensing of new commercial  banks. A large number of banks, it was thought, would quickly
generate the competition needed to drive down deposit and lending rates and provide the
lending needed to  support the  emerging private sector.  Many new private banks were
established  by enterprises  to gain access  to a preferential  and much cheaper source  of funding
than was available  from existing  banking institutions.  Little thought was given initially to the
implications of  this policy for  banking safety and  supervision.  There were similarities
therefore in the three Baltic Republics in the development of the private banking systems,
each of which grew rapidly.
2.4  Estonia:  In  1987, as  in the other FSU  republics,  the Gosbank in Estonia spun off
five specialized state banks:  (i) Savings Bank; (ii) Agriculture  Bank;  (iii) Social Bank;  (iv)
Industry  and  Construction;  Bank  and  (v)  Foreign  Trade  Bank--Vnesheconombank,  later
renamed the North Estonian Share Bank (NESB).  Estonia later moved to a two-tier  banking
system.  The Bank of Estonia (BOE) was established in  1990, and its position as the central
bank  was affirmed  when,  after Estonian Independence was declared  in 1991, the BOE took
over the Estonian branch of Gosbank.
2.5  The state banks were augmented by the creation of  new banks;  by  1992,  25 new
banks  had been licensed.  In addition,  the Agriculture Bank (Maapank), had split up into 14
entities, which were operating separately.  Hence, the total number of banks was 43 (25 new
banks,  14 Agriculture  Bank spin-offs,  and the 4 other  state banks).  Licensing requirements
were  rather  lax;  minimum  capital  was set  at only  5  million  rubles,  which,  in  1992 was
equivalent to less than $40,000.  The evolving structure of the Estonian banking system can be
gleaned from Table 1.
2.6  LatYia:  In Latvia,  meanwhile, the Bank of Latvia (BOLAT) was also established
in July  1990.  The Government  decided that, with the exception of the Savings Bank, the 45
branches  of  the former  Soviet banks  would be  combined and  placed  under  the  auspices of
BOLAT. This  approach allowed the Latvian Government to  proceed on a  bank  restructuring
strategy which had a  very flexible departure point.  It permitted the Government to consider a
range of options:  selling off all the branches to the emerging private sector;  privatizing the
branches individually or in groups; creating one or more state banks; or a combination of these
approaches.  The disadvantage was that the BOLAT did not play any type of governance role in
the branches under  its  wing.  Branch managers,  therefore,  felt no accountability towards the
President of the  BOLAT or  its directors.  As a  result.  from  the time the 45 branches were
combined under  BOLAT  until  the  creation  of  Unibank,  a  significant amount  of  imprudent
lending--in the order of US$50 million equivalent--took place.
2.7  It was decided to keep the Savings Bank  initially in the public sector,  submit it to
considerable institutional cievelopment  support, and then privatize it in due course.  The lack of
strong management meant that the financial condition of this bank has gradually deteriorated.
The remnant  of the state banks held under BOLAT was dealt with in three ways.  Nine branches
were  sold to private  commercial banks.  Then,  fifteen of  the branches were consolidated into
4eight private banks and sold through offerings of shares.  Finally, on September 28,  1993 the
rump  of  21  branches  was structured  into one  state bank--the  Universal Bank  of  Latvia,  or
Unibank--and subjected to intense institutional development support.
2.8  By 1993, over  sixty new commercial banks had been licensed in Latvia.  Some of
them  were  'pocket'  banks  owned  by  state  enterprises,  some  were  purely  private  but  were
dedicated mainly to raising deposits to on-lend to the owners, and some were set up with specific
functions in mind (Olympia bank was set up to help finance the Latvian Olympic team). All of
these private or  quasi-private banks were  allowed to  develop with little supervision from  the
BOLAT initially.
2.9  The new commercial banking sector grew very rapidly in relation to the remainder of
the state banking sector over the period 1992-94.  Between December 1992 and December 1994,
the  new commercial banking sector  share  of total  assets grew  from  47%  to  85%.  Credits
granted by  the banking system also grew  sharply over this  period, with  the new commercial
banks accounting for 89% of the total by the end of 1994, up from only 23% two years earlier
(see Table 1).
2.10  Among the private banks that developed very quickly in  1993 and  1994 was Bank
Baltija.  Its assets grew from about US$25 million in January 1993 to US$242 million in January
1994, and  then to  almost US$500  million by early  1995.  Bank  Baltija became the  largest
Latvian commercial bank in terms of assets, capital and deposit funding by  1994.  The bank's
reported capital grew from about US$1 million in early 1993 to US$20 million in January 1994
and to US$44 million in January  1995.  The bank had 37 branches and 49 offices throughout
Latvia with 1,300 employees in total.  In April  1995, when the banking crisis began, the bank
had total deposits of US$392 million.  Bank Baltija was at the heart of the Latvian banking crisis.
2.11  Lithuania:  In  contrast,  the  Lithuanian  Government  decided  early  on  to
corporatize and partially privatize the three specialized state-owned banks which were split off
from Gosbank: the State Savings Bank, the State Agriculture  Bank and the State Commercial
Bank.  Up to 49% private ownership was permitted through the infusion of new capital.  The
Government  maintained  a  51 %  ownership  share.  However,  this  privatization  was  done
without  appropriate  disclosure  of  the  banks'  financial  condition  (International  Accounting
Standards  [IAS] audits  showing that  the banks  were  insolvent  were  not  made  available  to
potential purchasers)  and without  any  improvements in corporate  governance  or  changes  in
management.  Early attempts at restructuring the State Savings Bank were unsuccessful as they
were partial  in  nature3 and  again  were  not accompanied  by any  improvements in corporate
governance or changes in management.  Nevertheless, among others as a result of the explicit
deposit protection  provided to  its  depositors,  the State Savings  Bank has  managed to  grow
significantly in the years since independence.  Due also to the reluctance of the newly-created
3  The restructuring only addressed  the claim of the  bank  on the  former all-USSR  Savings  Bank  head  office in Moscow but
not the rapidly growing portfolio of new  bad loans. Artificial  limits on its lending to private enterprises  encouraged  the
bank  to move  more aggressively  into interbanik  lending  and lending  to state  cnterprises  of equally  doubtful quality.
54
Central Bank--the Bank of Lithuania (BOLIT)--to use its regulatory and supervisory powers
the financial condition  of the three  state banks  steadily deteriorated  during  the period  1992-
1996, with an increasing number of incidents of fraud occurring.
2.12  Many new commercial banks emerged  in Lithuania:  some as the treasury arm of
their  state-owned enterprise  founders.  However,  rapid  progress  in enterprise  privatization,
through Lithuania's  mass privatization program,  and  successful attempts to  raise new capital
rapidly  enhanced  the true  private  influence  in  these  banks.  Twenty-five  new  commercial
banks were  in operation  by March  1995; approximately  eight of these could be characterized
as active banks, both in terms of asset size and activity.  The remainder were foreign exchange
offices or true 'pocket'  banks that lent primarily to their owners.
2.13  The share of the new private banks (by assets) in Lithuania's  total banking system
increased  rapidly  to  reach  46%  by  December  1993 (see  Table  1).  Since then  it has been
relatively  stable,  although  within  the  group  of  private  banks,  a  clear  trend  towards
consolidation  has been discernible  since late  1993, with  a  small number  of  banks growing
rapidly and an increasing number of 'pocket'  banks going out of existence.
2.14  The  funding  of  the  fast-growing  banks  came  mainly  from  new  private  sector
enterprises,  and was to a large extent foreign currency denominated.  Lending activities were
mostly  focused  on  newly-private and  privatized  enterprises  engaged  in  trade,  services,  and
manufacturing, with the notable exception of Innovation Bank, which lent mainly, and often at
the Government's  explicit urging,  to the energy sector which to date is still plagued by many
structural problems.
4  For example,  while BOLIT undertook  on-site  examinations  in nearly  all private banks  during the  last two years.  BOLIT,
until very recently, refused  to undertake  such  examinations  in any of the state-owned  banks, claiming that  the problems
of these  banks  were the  Government's  responsibility,  and not those  of the  regulator.
6TABLE 1:  EVOLVING STRUCTURE OF THE BALTIC FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
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Sep. 924  18  25  43
Dec. 93  2  20  22
Dec. 94  3  18  3  24
Jan.  96  1  13  9  23
Assets,  % of total
Sep. 92  60%  40%  - US$  427 million
Dec. 93  23%  77%  US$  543 million
Dec. 94  28%  72%  N/A  US$  880 million
Jan. 96  10%  90%  N/A  US$ 1220 million
Capital,  % of total
Sep. 92  22%  78%  US$  16 million
Dec. 93  10%  90%  US$  62 million
Dec. 94  11%  89%  N/A  US$  89 million




Dec. 92  2 (86)'  50  (18)  52 (104)
Dec. 93  2 (56)  59  (82)  61 (138)
Dec. 94  2 (56)  53  (121)  - 55 (177)
Dec. 95  2 (61)  37  (103)  1  40 (164)
Assets,  % of total
Dec. 92  53%  37%  - US$  605 million
iec.  93  27%  73%  US$  964 million
Dec. 94  15%  85%  US$ 1138 million
Dec. 95  27%  74%  N\A  US$ 1542 million
Capital,  % of total
Dec. 92  15%  85%  US$  22 million
Dec. 93  12%  88%  US$  122 million
Dec. 94  13%  87%  US$  336 million




Dec. 92  3 (121)  N/A  N/A
Dec. 93  3 (121)  24 (N/A)  27  (N/A)
Dec. 94  3 (121)  24 (N/A)  27  (N/A)
Dec. 95  3 (121)  13 (129)  16  (250)3
Assets, % of total
Dec. 92  N/A  N/A  N/A
Dec. 93  54%  46%  US$  1025 million
Dec. 94  54%  46%  US$  1451 million
Dec. 95  53%  47%  US$  1777 million
Capital, % of total
Dec. 92  N/A  N/A  N/A
Dec. 93  N/A  N/A  N/A
Dec. 94  51%  49%  US$  249 million
Dec. 95  51%  49%  US$  261 million
1  Number of branches are in brackets.
2  State banks that were a remnant of the Soviet System only.
3  Excluding banks in liquidation or bankruptcy.
4  Pre-crises: data.  December  1992 was  omitted, as the Bank of Estonia was undergoing a bank relicensing process at the
time.  January  1996 data is shown in lieu of December 1995
5  Asset and capital data must be read with caution.  Banks gradually converted to IAS standards over the period studied; hence,
not all the reported figures are comparable.  Many banks reported numbers that did  not include proper provision for loan
losses, with the  result of inflating both assets and capital figures.
6  Data for  new commercial  bank includes the Latvian Mortgage and Land Bank (relatively new state bank) and the Latvian
Investment Bank (35% state owned)
7  Estonian Investment Bank data was not available for  inclusion in 1996 figures.
8  Figures for December  1992 represent former branches of BOLAT that were overseen by the Bank Privatization
Committee.  Figures beginning with December  1993 (March,  December 1994 and 1995) reflect the operations of  Unibank .III.  HOW  THE CRISES  AROSE
3.1  Banking  crises surfaced in  Estonia in  1992, in  Latvia in  early 1995 and in
Lithuania in  late 1995.  In  all three countries there was a multiplicity of  causes of  the
banking crises; some of  these--systemic  in nature--had been working on the fabric  of  the
banking system for many months or even years.  These underlying causes are described in
Chapter IV. Private banks were primarily involved in the crises in all three countries.  But in
each of  the  Republics, there were differing events leading up to  the  crises and different
triggers  that brought them to a head.  A number of specific  factors were also at play in each.
In  Estonia, the proximate cause was the freezing  of  assets in  Moscow of  two important
banks, coupled with the drying up of cheap credits  from BOE, which had previously endowed
Estonian banks with significant profits and liquidity.  The crisis was ultimately triggered  by
liquidity difficulties.  In Latvia the proximate cause was the drying up of  highly profitable
trade-financing opportunities and general mismanagement and corruption in the operations
of  banks (particularly evident in  Bank  Baltija).  The trigger of  the  crisis was BOLAT's
requirement  that banks be properly audited using IAS principles.  A liquidity squeeze ensued
as doubts about the  solvency of  several banks grew.  Banks in  Lithuania,  as in  Latvia,
suffered a compression in  their profits due to the contraction of  lucrative trade financing
opportunities. An additional  factor in the Lithuanian case, however, was the Government's
role in pressing some banks (both state-owned and private) to lend to finance  quasi-fiscal
expenditures.  The trigger in this case was leaks of the results of on-site examinations of two
banks which led to runs on each bank and liquidity shortages.
3.2  Estonia: Prior to independence,  most of the financial resources collected by local
branches of the state banks were sent back to the main headquarters  of each bank in  Moscow.
In early 1992, the Moscow offices of the Vnesheconombank  and the Savings Bank froze all
assets belonging  to non-Russian  banks.  This caused  financial  problems  in banks throughout  the
former Soviet republics.  In Estonia, this primarily affected three banks: the NESB and the
Union Baltic Bank, which had both placed considerable  assets with the Vnesheconombank  in
Moscow, and the Savings Bank. The frozen amounts were considerable:  approximately  $40
million of NESB assets,  approximately  $36 million of UBB assets and approximately $25
million  in Savings  Bank  assets.
3.3  Since the Savings Bank held over 85  % of the household savings at the time,  the
BOE decided  to take action to make sure that these savings were protected. In April, 1992, the
BOE took over the ownership of the Savings Bank, swapping  some of its own assets for the
Savings  Bank's claim on the Moscow Saving's Bank. The BOE's decision to assist the Savings
Bank was in part motivated by the desire to minimize disruptions to public confidence during
the introduction  of Estonia's new currency  (the kroon) planned  for June, 1992.
3.4  The NESB and UBB  continued  to operate on the assumption  that the asset freeze was
temporary, and therefore did not properly husband their scarce liquid funds.  The liquidity
problems were exacerbated by Estonia's new, tight monetary policy, which came into force
with the introduction  of the kroon.  The kroon was pegged  to the Deutsche  Mark, and was fully
backed by gold and convertible foreign  currency reserves.  A currency board system was
established,  meaning that the central bank could not issue new base money unless there was a
corresponding  increase in convertible foreign currency, or  in the case of a  sharply defined
banking crisis.  As a result of these reforms, commercial  banks could no longer rely on the
central bank as a source of cheap credit.  Up to that point, some banks had bolstered theirearnings by charging high spreads on loans financed from these cheap credits.  In addition, the
new  unified  exchange  rate  reduced  arbitrage  opportunities  and  buy-sell  spreads,  reducing
foreign exchange revenues.
3.5  Another  large private  commercial bank,  the Tartu  Commercial Bank  (TCB),  also
began having liquidity problems, as the new tight money policy made it impossible to use new
credits to disguise problems in its  loan portfolio.  In November of  1992, a  serious liquidity
crisis developed in the three  largest commercial banks:  TCB,  UBB. and NESB.  Payments
began slowing down; for example, the average transfer time for a UBB payment slowed from
four days to almost a month.  UBB finally froze all accounts of state-owned enterprises,  in the
hopes that this act would force the Government to assist UBB, particularly with regard to some
of UBB's assets that were frozen in Moscow.  Instead, the BOE placed a  moratorium on all
three banks.  Assets in these distressed banks accounted for about  40% of total banking assets.
3.6  Subsequently, further banking problems have arisen in Estonia,  involving  banking
distress in the Social Bank and the North Estonian Bank (see Box 1).  These problems have not
been so well publicized as the crisis of 1992 because a less significant volume of banking assets
has been involved and no systemic threat existed.
3.7  Latvia: The banking crisis in Latvia came to a head towards the end of March 19955,
precipitated in part by the insistence of the BOLAT that all banks should prepare and present to
its Banking Supervision Department financial statements that had been audited on the basis of
IAS.  It was the failure of Bank Baltija to present such accounts, or indeed to give its auditors full
access to needed documentation for the audit of its 1994 financials that set off a chain of events
leading to the bank's declaration of insolvency. But Bank Baltija was not the only bank involved
in the crisis at this stage.  Other banks included the Latvian Deposit Bank, Centra Bank and
Olimpija Bank, all middle-sized banks that were eventually declared insolvent.  A number of
6 smaller banks also experienced difficulty.  In all, about 40%  of banking system assets were
conmpromised,  totaling almost US$900 million.
3.8  The growing public perception that Bank Baltija was in difficulty led to a withdrawal of
deposits from the bank, mostly by enterprises initially. Households were slower to grasp the
gravity of the problem and so their withdrawals were more of a trickle than a classical run.  The
other banks  that  were  involved in  the crisis  also  experienced similar  effects vis-a-vis their
deposits.  Large numbers of small deposit holders were caught when the banks'  doors were
closed.
3.9  There were a  number of specific factors underlying the Baltija Bank problem, with
some also applicable to other banks (see Box 2).  The first related to Latvia's  special position
between East and West which made it especially attractive as  conduit for trade between the two
areas.  Special financing opportunities arose during 1993/4 on account of the fact that prices of
metals and other commodities in Russia remained well below world market prices.  Latvian banks
Although  seven  smaller  banks  had  been  declared  insolvent  in 1994: LUitta,  Latvian Bank  for Reconstruction  and
Development,  Baltic Bank  for Reconstruction  and Development.  Kurzeme,  Sigulda,  Tautas  and  Top-banka.
6  Other  banks  declared  insolvent  in 1995  were  Latintrade.  Latgale  Commercial  Bank. Liepajas  Commercial  Bank,
Polarzviagzne  Bank  and Alejas  Commercial  Bank. Kredo Bank,  Olti-Bank  and  Bauskas  Bank.
9Box 1:  Banking Distress in the Social Bank and the North Estonian Bank
The Social Bank
The resolution of the  1992 crisis did not mean the end of all banking problems in Estonia.  In  1994, the  Social
Bank, one of the former spin-offs from Gosbank, developed serious liquidity problems.  The precipitating cause
was  the Government's  decision  in the  spring  of  1994 to  withdraw  much  of the  state's  budget deposits  (the
equivalent of  about $15 million) from the Social Bank, and  reallocate the  deposits among several  banks  in the
system.  By August,  1994, about US26 million of other deposits had been withdrawn,  the bank ran into serious
liquidity problems,  and was placed  into moratorium.  However,  the  root cause of  the  bank's  problems  was a
combination of  mismanagement and  fraud.  Lending procedures  were  not followed,  and  in some cases openly
overruled by shareholders.  Loans were made to nonexistent companies, or were made to companies clearly not
financially capable of repaying loans of the size they were given.
The Authorities were  not as  strict  in the handling of  this bank  failure.  The Bank of  Estonia,  which several
weeks before the Social Bank went into moratorium had declared the Social Bank was financially sound,  felt that
it had some responsibility to the depositors,  who had  relied on the BOE's  statements.  The BOE had also,  for
several weeks,  encouraged other commercial  banks  to provide interbank  loans to the Social Bank.  The BOE
attempted to restore  confidence in the bank by providing liquidity support.  It also sought for several months a
potential partner or buyer for the Social Bank.  One small bank, the Estonian Arengupank merged with the Social
Bank, but it was unable to provide sufficient resources to help the Social Bank.  The BOE also began selling off
assets of the Social Bank to try  to raise  funds.  Ultimately, however,  all these efforts failed to keep the bank
afloat.  In March,  1995, about  US$12 million  of  the  "better" assets  were  transferred  to  the North  Estonian
Bank, along with accompanying liabilities, including EEK 38.5 million (US$3 million ) of BOE claims that were
transformned  into equity.  The remaining assets and liabilities were  left with the Social Bank, which essentially
was simply transformed into a loan recovery agency.  The result of all this was that the Social Bank depositors
were  generally  made whole,  but the shareholders were  wiped  out.  Other  creditors  were  left with claims  on
recovered assets.
The overall message from  this bank  failure was not as  clear  as in the  1992 crisis.  Although the Social Bank
clearly had been mismanaged,  the BOE provided liquidity support and sought other means of saving the bank.
The eventual liquidation of  the bank did leave a residual  "tough" message -- but the interim maneuvers diluted
this message.
The North Estonian Batik
The NEB also is still not out of the woods. The initial recapitalization proved to be  inadequate, as many of the
loans  inherited  by  the  new  bank  turned  out  to  be  uncollectible.  Unfortunately,  after  the  merger  and
recapitalization,  the new management did not seem capable of running the bank well.  For more than two years
afterward,  the new NEB management continued their poor  lending policies.  In addition, the  NEB was further
weakened by mismanagement in other areas, such as poor treasury operations, and also by continuing to provide
interbank loans to the Social Bank, when all the other banks had ceased to provide such support.  The transfer of
Social Bank assets and liabilities to the NEB has  also proved to be  only a transfer of  problems from one  weak
bank to another.  Although the  1995 audit is not yet complete, it appears that the accumulated bad loans from the
NEB and Social Bank operations will be considerable. The NEB may yet still survive.  One of the stronger banks
in Estonia, Uhispank, has purchased 16.7% of NEB for 10 million EEK (less than US$1 million),  and also has
the  option to purchase  the  remaining shares.  Uhispank has  replaced  the  management  of  the  NEB,  and  has
stopped its most egregious lose-making practices (it has tightened up lending and has limited treasury operations
to matched transactions only).  However,  it is not yet clear what the ultimate outcome of this situation will be --
the NED is unlikely to be able to "earn  its way out"  without some outside injection of funds.  The Authorities
also have been surprisingly supportive, although there was clear  evidence of  mismanagement of this bank.  The
BOE  has plans to provide a guarantee which would cover any shortfall in the loan portfolio.  It appears that the
distinction is that the BOE and Government feel a greater level of responsibility toward this bank, as they were
instrumental in its creation and also have compounded the problems with the Social Bank asset transfer.  It is not
yet clear that this guarantee will be sufficient to save this bank.
10were instrumental in financing East/West trade of this type.  It was very profitable for both the
traders and the banks, and the latter were able to charge high rates of interest on the financing.
The existence of this type of high return opportunity encouraged several Latvian banks to become
involved.  The main  difficulty came  when Russian  prices rose  to  near  world  levels  and  the
financing opportunities began to dry up.  This led to considerable pressure on banks to find other
lending outlets.  This put downward pressure on banks' profit margins as the banks scrambled to
find equally profitable but riskier lending outlets.
Box 2.  The Bank Baliija Collapse
Bank Baltija's collapse is an example of classic banking distress brought about by mismanagement
on a  massive scale.  Apart from  elements of  fraud and  corruption,  there was poor  management of
currency risk,  and interest rate risk.  There  is evidence that Bank Baltija--and possibly other banks as
well--followed a  very  high  risk  strategy  in  bidding  for  Lat  deposits at  very  high  interest  rates.
Convinced that the  Lat  would depreciate vis-a-vis the  US dollar,  Baltija repeatedly converted large
volumes of Lats into US dollars and on-lent these dollars, thereby creating a large open forex position.
As it turned out, the Lat appreciated considerably against the US dollar over the  1994/5 period.  It is
possible that Bank Baltija believed that by putting itself in a position where it dominated the banking
system, any doubts about its own solvency would precipitate a fall in the Lat and, thereby, improve the
bank's financial condition. 7 A third related explanation for Bank Baltija's strategy is associated with its
ambition to become a major retail bank.  Given that it was able to charge very high rates on its trade
related lending, Baltija was in a position to offer very high deposit rates.  This it did with a view to
siphoning off depositors from other banks, particularly the Savings Bank. Queues formed as potential
depositors, oblivious to the risks involved, opened accounts with Bank Baltija at a rate of 90 percent for
one  year  deposits.  Baltija management furthered  this  aggressive  strategy by  opening  a  significant
number of  branches around the country.  But  this  strategy back-fired as  market  interest rates  fell,
exposing Baltija to significant net interest margin pressures.
As it expanded aggressively, Bank Baltija also undertook many profligate expenditures, including
throwing lavish parties for clients and government officials.  This activity was apparently undertaken as
a  means of  insuring itself politically against any  future difficulties it might encounter.  In  general,
systems were not put in place to properly manage the bank, particularly, as noted above, in the area of
risk management. The bankruptcy of Bank Baltija was first petitioned at the end of  1995 by the Bank of
Latvia but the owners successfully appealed against this order of the economic court.  The bank was
again declared bankrupt on April 3,  1996 by Riga District Court on the grounds that no feasible plan for
rehabilitating and recapitalizing the bank had been presented.  At the time of  writing a second appeal
against the declaration of bankruptcy had reportedly been successful.
3.10  A factor which may have pushed some banks into ill-advised lending was the ease
of  availability of certain  foreign credit  linesg that  were guaranteed by  the Government.  The
banks approved for  channeling these credit  lines often did not  have adequate mechanisms  in
place for screening borrowers.
3.11  Lithuania:  The  banking crisis  started  in Lithuania  in early  1995 and  gradually
picked up  steam until events brought  it to a head in December  1995, with the imposition of a
moratorium on Innovation Bank (the largest private,  and second largest bank9 overall  in terms
This explanation  for Bank  Baltija's demise is contained in a paper by Hallagan. Big Bang Banking Reform: the Latvian
erperience.  July 1995.
8  This funding was intended originally for balance of payments financing.
9  All references to the ranking of Lithuanian banks are based on end-June 1995 data.
I1of total assets), Vakaru Bank (the sixth largest), and Litimpex Bank (the seventh largest), which
together were holding approximately 29% of total bank deposits.  All these were private banks.
3.12  Among the specific factors at play in Lithuania, were downward pressures on bank
income that occurred as a result of the introduction of a currency board in April  1994 and the
drying  up of  the initially  very  lucrative  metal trade  in which  Lithuanian banks  also  actively
participated.  A further specific factor was the tendency on the part of the Government to put
pressure on a number of banks--in particular the State Agriculture Bank and Innovation Bank--
to finance quasi-fiscal expenditures.  Faced with tightening fiscal expenditure and direct lending
ceilings under its successive IMF stabilization programs,  the Government increasingly (and in a
less concealed manner) resorted  to using  the banking system  as a  source of  financing of  the
agricultural  and  energy  sectors  where  structural  imbalances  persisted.  The  result,  as  loan
losses mounted, was a deepening of the already existing insolvencies.  In addition as in Latvia,
a large part of foreign balance of payments support was used to finance bank loans of dubious
quality.  Finally, the total absence of foreign banks in Lithuania and, until recently,  reputable
foreign bank  shareholders,  may also have played  a role.  While  the licensing and  regulatory
regime was the same for foreign and local banks, the BOLIT in fact discouraged foreign banks
from coming in,  thereby depriving  the Lithuanian banking system of the positive competitive
pressures and higher quality services normally brought by their presence.
3.13  In the Spring of  1995, five pocket banks had their minimum reserve balances with
BOLIT  frozen  due  to  reported  liquidity  problems  and  violation  of  their  minimum  reserve
requirements;  these  have  since  officially  been  declared  bankrupt  either  by  the  general
prosecutor's  office or by their  shareholders/creditors.  By the end of June  1995, ten smaller
banks were  officially under  administration."'  Seven of the administrators  were  appointed by
BOLIT and three by failing banks'  shareholders or creditors.
3.14  To cope with shrinking profit margins, among other reasons, Innovation Bank and
Litimpex Bank  had been pursuing  a  merger  since the  summer of  1995 and  their  operations
became increasingly entangled during the latter half of  1995, notwithstanding the fact that the
BOLIT had not yet given permission for either the merger or the "defacto"  integration of the
two banks'  operations.  The first BOLIT on-site examinations in the two banks were undertaken
during late autumn,  revealing major irregularities  in financial and prudential reporting by both
banks.  The examination reports  were leaked to the press,  triggering  a run on both banks and
causing a  liquidity  squeeze which  also  affected Vakaru  Bank,  which  was  vulnerable due  to
liquidity  problems  it  had  experienced  earlier.  This  led  BOLIT  to  impose  a  temporary
moratorium on the activities of Innovation Bank and  Litimpex Bank on December  19,  1995.
On December  21,  1995 the powers  of the  shareholders'  council  of Vakaru  Bankllwere  also
suspended,  its  management  board  was removed,  and  an  administrator  was appointed.  The
specific circumstances of the Innovation Bank failure are described in Box 3.
Among these banks was Aura Bank (with total assets of US$37 million), which experienced serious liquidity problems
during May 1995.
But already in August 1995, after the discovery during the first on-site examination of deposit-taking in foreign currency
from shareholders at above-market interest rates and onlending at below-market rates. BOLIT suspended the right of
Vakaru Bank to make loans and issue guarantees (but not the right to take deposits) indefintely.
12Box 3. The Innovation  Bank's  Failure
Rapid growth--  Innovation Bank's  assets  grew from  the  equivalent of  US$16 million at the  end of
1993, to US$77 million and US$169 million at year end  1994, and  1995.  By June 1995 assets had grown
to the equivalent of US$216 million.  To achieve this growth,  the bank paid above market interest rates on
deposits.  In addition, the bank rapidly expanded its branch network by building expensive facilities.  Fixed
Assets were in excess of  15% of total assets at the end of  1995, when over 30% of  the bank's  branches
were unprofitable,  but were kept open due to "competitive factors".
Industry concentration-- The bank focused lending activities in the energy sector.  The energy sector
in Lithuania is highly risky, characterized by high costs, heavy expenditures, severe payment arrears,  and
politically influenced decision making processes.
Insider and  Political  Influences-- The bank's  largest  shareholders (together  owning  15.2%  of  the
bank) were  companies  involved  in oil trading.  The bank  also  extended  large  credits  to  suppliers  and
customers of the  Ignalina Nuclear Power Station and other large,  state-owned energy companies.  At the
end of  1994, US$30 million equivalent of loans  to connected parties were  classified  as non-performing
under lAS accounting principles.  At the end of  1995, the largest credit in the bank was to LSPS,  the state
energy company.
Intentional disregard of Prudential Rules and financial warning signals-- IAS audits for  1993 and
1994 revealed the bank's  insolvency.  The 1993 audit uncovered violations of loan covenants by the bank.
The  1993 audit also reflected  the bank's  non-compliance  with prudential rules  and contained  statements
such as  "management believes the banking regulator will not take any action with respect  to this apparent
violation".  Innovation Bank took little, if any, steps to resolve violations of the prudential rules.  The bank
ignored the shrinking margins resulting from the general economic situation, high rates of interest paid on
deposits, and lack of repayment on loans.  By the end of  1995, the bank approached a negative net interest
margin, yet it continued  to extend funds to non-perforning  borrowers and rolled  over interest on credits.
During  1995, operating expenses exceeded net operating revenue by 20%.  Management's  solution was to
continue to increase the size of the bank, including the proposed merger with Litimpex Bank.
Insufrncient  supervision-- While the BOLIT cannot be  blamed for weak,  ineffective management in
commercial  banks,  the  lack  of  timely  enforcement  in  this  case,  given  all  the  clear  warning  signals,
permitted the size of the problem to grow.  Timely action on the part of the BOLIT--intended to assess the
magnitude of the bank's  insolvency--could perhaps have limited the cost.
13IV.  THE POLICY  RESPONSE
4.1  All three republics were, for  the most part,  ill-prepared for  the banking crises that
erupted.  The immediate crisis response differed among the  three.  The Estonians  were the
most decisive, promptly closing the main banks concerned and requiring shareholders as well
as depositors to  absorb  losses.  The Latvian and Lithuanian Authorities  meanwhile became
initially involved in protracted negotiations with bank owners and managers.  Banking crises
are events that can have a profound  effect  on the longer-term evolution of banking systems,
through changing the behavior  of banks  and  strengthening the  resolve of  the supervision
Authorities.  While it is too early to gauge the longer-term response by the Authorities  in the
case  of  the  Lithuanian banking  crisis,  the  response  in both  Estonia  and Latvia  has  been
significant.  As  a  result,  there  has  been  a  major  change  in the  structure  of  the  banking
sector,  supervision and regulation has been tightened,  and a more  robust banking system is
emerging.
4.2  Estonia:  When  the  crisis  occurred  in  Estonia  the  Authorities  decided--and
announced very quickly--that a harsh solution was needed.  The Prime Minister warned that the
1993 budget had no funds for a bailout.  Although the currency  board arrangement did  allow
for the BOE to provide credit in a banking crisis,  the BOE and the IMF took the stance that the
large  scale  of  the  proposed  bailout  would  be  inflationary  and  would  undermine  the  fixed
exchange rate.
4.3  The management of Tartu Commercial Bank attempted to put together a rescue plan,
but the BOE considered the plan unrealistic,  and criticized the bank for  poor credit  analysis,
bad records,  and failure to follow  standard prudential banking practices.  The BOE therefore
decided that since the bank's  problems stemmed primarily from  its own mismanagement, that
any rescue would just  lead to moral  hazard problems in the future;  thus,  the BOE moved to
liquidate the bank.  TCB's  assets were  sold, and the depositors  received about 60% of their
deposits; shareholders received nothing.
4.4  The BOE took a different approach to the other two banks.  Since the primary cause
of  UBB  and  NESB's  problems  was  the  freezing  of  their  assets  by  the  Moscow
Vnesheconombank--which  was an  event  that  the banks'  managers  could  neither  control  nor
anticipate--the Authorities decided not to liquidate the banks.  However,  since the banks could
not be held entirely blameless for their financial positioii, the shareholders did bear appreciable
costs.
4.5  The Authorities  decided  to  merge the UBB and  the NESB,  into a  new entity,  the
North Estonian Bank (NEB).  The BOE and the Government then created a Vnesheconombank-
fund (VEB-fund),  which issued certificates backed by the frozen assets held in Moscow.  The
shareholders were given VEB certificates in lieu of their shares;  hence they received virtually
nothing for  their  shares.  The Government  also exchanged  VEB bonds from  the  new bank,
NEB, for Government bonds.  Hence, the valueless frozen assets on the NEB's  balance sheet
were  transformed  into  (also  valueless)  VEB  certificates,  which  were  then  exchanged  for
Government bonds,  which did  have value.  The Government  also  added additional bonds to
strengthen the NEB's  balance sheet,  and  in return took  100% ownership of the bank.  As a
result  of  this  financial engineering:  (i)  the  shareholders  received  almost  nothing;  (ii) the
14depositors  were  protected  since  the  Government  replaced  the  banks'  bad  assets  with
Government bonds and (iii), the Government took ownership of the bank.
4.6  After the immediate crisis  was resolved,  the Bank of Estonia  instituted a licensing
review.  A number of banks were delicensed and a number were merged.  By mid-1993,  the
number of banks in Estonia had decreased from 43 to 23.  The Bank of Estonia also began to
strengthen supervision.  A new Law  on Credit Institutions was passed in  December of  1994,
increasing  the  BOE's  supervision  and  enforcement  capabilities.  In  addition,  the  new  law
required  that  all  banks develop  internal auditing  departments,  and  that all  banks  be  audited
annually be external auditors.  Starting in  1995, all banks were  required  to  use International
Accounting Standards for their financial statements
4.7  Latvia: The BOLAT initially provided a modest amount of liquidity support for Bank
Baltija that was at the center of the banking crisis.  Large corporate names such as the Latvian
Shipping Company' 2 also provided direct liquidity support.  Initially it was believed that Baltija's
insolvency problem was of moderate size--on the order of US$50 million--but as the accountants
dug deeper into Baltija's financial operations, it became clear that the bank's  negative net worth
was much larger, about US$320 million or 7% of the expected 1995 GDP.  The BOLAT at this
time refused to provide further liquidity support.  Instead, the BOLAT and Government officials
began protracted negotiations with the owners and management of Baltija. Such negotiations were
necessary because BOLAT lacked powers under the banking law to formally intervene a bank.
The owners and managers sought to stall for time by, among other things,  suggesting a merger
with the Latvian Deposit Bank and Centra Bank (these banks were also declared insolvent at a
later stage) so that they could try to  come up  with a  recapitalization plan.  In  retrospect,  this
provided a window of opportunity for managers and owners to undertake an asset stripping of the
bank.
4.8  Of the roughly  US$500 million in assets on Baltija's  books when the crisis  began,
some US$260 million had disappeared by the time it was declared insolvent in July  1995.  In
addition, funds were blocked at Baltija's correspondent accounts with banks in Russia,  Belarus
and Ukraine.
4.9  Subsequently, the BOLAT took over the management of the bank in the context of an
Agreement drafted between the owners and management on the one side and  the BOLAT and
Ministry of Finance on the other.  Initially, this Agreement was used by the owners and managers
to try to obtain concessions from the Government, on the principle that Baltija was too big to fail
and that its fall would have significant political ramifications.  Ultimately, as the depth of the
problem became known, and following advice from the World Bank and the IMF, the Agreement
was redrafted to give full control of the bank to the BOLAT (Baltija's owners could regain control
of the bank if they fully recapitalized it--an unlikely event given the degree of insolvency of the
bank).  So the Agreement served to provide the BOLAT with the powers to run and dispose of
Baltija.
4.10  The Latvian Authorities had to deal not only with the immediate management of the
crisis  but also with the crisis  of confidence in the banking sector at large.  Urgent changes in
12  The Latvian Shipping Company and connected companies abroad have lent funds to Bank Baltija in an amount of Ls 23
million (US$46 million).  These loans were secured by a mortgage on Baltija's loan portfolio,  real estate and vehicles.
15the  legal,  regulatory,  supervisory  and  institutional  framework  have  been  made  in  recent
months.  In order to rekindle confidence in the banking sector, the Government initially decided
to compensate household depositors who lost funds in the failed banks.  The Government set a
compensation ceiling  of  Lat  500  (US$1,000)  per  depositor.  In  the  subsequent  three  years
depositors  would receive under  the plan Lat  100 (US$200) additional per  year.  With a new
Government now in place,  and severe tightness in the state budget, there are doubts about the
future of the compensation scheme, which will most likely depend on recoveries from assets in
banks under liquidation.
4.11  In response to the banking crisis, the Bank of Latvia developed three banking laws--a
new commercial banking law, a law that would set up a bank rehabilitation/liquidation agency,
and a law that would create a deposit insurance system. These actions were taken in an effort to
rebuild  shattered  public  confidence  in  the  banking  system  and  to  strengthen  the  legal  and
institutional framework for banking. The new Commercial Banking Law was much more detailed
and inclusive than the 1992 statute (see Box 4), and was enacted in October,  1995.  Budgetary
pressures meant that the other two laws were not ultimately enacted.  13
4.12  BOLAT subsequently hired additional supervisory staff, moved to tighten prudential
regulations, and required banks to establish internal control departments.  BOLAT also arranged
for external accounting firms to supplement the work of the Bank of Latvia's on-site examiners.
This more intense supervision focuses on the "core"  banks that are permitted to take household
deposits.  A number of additional banks have been forced to close with the result that at present
there are only 39 banks permitted to operate.  And of these, only 14 have full banking licenses
permitting them to accept household deposits.  The remaining 25 banks have restricted licenses.
Enforcement has been  improved through  an  amendment to  the  Administrative code that  has
permitted the Bank of Latvia to impose fines on bank  management for violations of prudential
regulations.
4.13  Lithuania: The  Lithuanian Authorities'  reactions to the early signs of the pending
crisis which unfolded during  the summer of  1995--especially in Aura Bank and Vakaru Bank--
was  to  provide  unconditional  support,  without  removal  of  management  or  suspension  of
shareholders'  rights.  In the case of Aura Bank, the BOLIT provided the bank with temporary
liquidity support, exhausting all the room it had for this purpose under the currency  board.  In
addition, the Government moved some of its deposit in other banks to Aura. Subsequently, the
Government negotiated a takeover of all of the bank's  outstanding shares with the shareholders
for a token amount, de facto wiping out  their ownership rights.  In the case of Vakaru Bank,
the Government channeled the proceeds of a special Treasury bill issue sold exclusively to the
stronger  banks outside the regular  auction mechanism to the bank.  This  sent a signal to the
banking community that there would be few if any penalties for imprudent behavior.
4.14  The  policy  response  to  the  December  1995  crisis  initially  appeared  more
forthright.  This  time,  however,  the Authorities'  hands were partially  tied by the passage  by
Parliament of a number of emergency pieces of legislation, as well as a new deposit insurance
3  Relying predominantly on enterprise bankruptcy laws which do not allow the bank regulator to play an active role in
resolving bank failings, do not recognize the special status of bank depositors among other creditors and do not allow the
decisive regulatory action needed to safeguard depositor confidence in the banking system.
16law'4  which  had  been  pending  in  Parliament  since  the  summer  of  1995.  The  emergency
legislation required the Government  to lift the moratorium on Innovation  Bank and Litimpex
Bank by  February  1,  1996 and  to  ensure  none  of the depositors  in  the  two banks  lost  any
money.  In addition,  legislation was passed allowing the Government to extend up to Litai 300
million (US$ 75 million) in guarantees for interbank borrowing as a means to address liquidity
problems  experienced  by  other  banks  suffering  from  a  loss  of  depositor  confidence  in  the
banking  system.  This  scheme  was  conceived  as  substituting  for  the  lender-of-last-resort
function of BOLIT,  which was very limited under the currency  board arrangement and already
exhausted by Aura Bank.  The scheme did not specify, however, which banks would be eligible
for  this  implicit  Government support,  again sending  a  signal to the banking  community that
Government support would not distinguish between prudent and imprudent banks.  Parliament
also  adopted  a  law  requiring  the  Government  to  retroactively  provide  compensation  to
individual depositors  in all smaller banks under bankruptcy up to Litai 2000 per  person (US$
500).
4.15  Notwithstanding these constraints, the Authorities, with the assistance of the World
Bank and  the  IMF  (during  January  1995), drew  up  a  detailed  bank  restructuring  plan  that
encompassed both the three insolvent state-owned banks and the four failed private banks.  This
plan  envisaged  full  recapitalization  and  renationalization  of  the  three  majority  state-owned
banks,  merger and  nationalization of Innovation Bank,  Litimpex Bank,  and Vakaru  Bank, and
liquidation  of  Aura  Bank.  Under  growing  public  pressure,  however,  and  charges  of
incompetence  and  insider  information  abuse,  shortly  after  the  passage  of  the  package  of
emergency legislation,  the Prime Minister and  several other ministers--as  well as the BOLIT
Governor  and  the  Head  of Bank  Supervision--were  forced to  resign.  In  anticipation of  the
October  1996 Parliamentary  elections,  a  new  care-taker  government  was  installed  in  mid-
March.  The change  in government  created room  for  the managers  and owners  of the three
banks  which  were  to  be  merged  to  open  negotiations  with  the  Authorities  on  alternative
solutions,  including  restructuring  plans  envisaging a combination  of existing  shareholder and
Government  support.  These negotiations are still ongoing.  Longer-term measures to further
strengthen  banking  legislation,  regulation  and  supervision  as  well  as  to  improve  corporate
governance  in the banks are also  envisaged  in the bank  restructuring  plan.  In addition,  the
Government  would,  as  part  of  the plan,  start  addressing  some  of  the  underlying  structural
problems in the agricultural and energy sectors which contributed to the banking crisis.  At this
moment,  it  is  not  clear  how  much  of  this  plan  the caretaker  government  will  be  able  to
implement.
4  This law envisages the creation of a deposit insurance fund initially capitalized  by the Government and subsequently  to be
financed by bank premia, covering individual Litai deposits in qualified banks (meeting BOLIT  prudential requirements)
up to Litai 5000 with a 20 percent co-insurance provision.  In February  1996,  the law was amended to extend cover to
individuals' foreign currency deposits as well.
17V.  THE IMPACT
5.1  The impact of banking crises can be gauged with reference to several broad
areas: the  economic and political impact and the impact on  the banking sector at  large.
Banking crises can typically affect a wide swathe of  the population and, therefore, can in
principle have major political repercussions. In Estonia, the main perceived impact has been
the  largely positive effect on  the  development of  the  banking  sector.  There were few
discernible  real economy or political implications. In Latvia, there has been an impact in all
three areas, while in Lithuania the situation is still unfolding and the full  impact is as yet
unclear.
The Economic and Political Impact
5.2  Estonia:  It  is difficult to  gauge the impact of the crisis  on the real  sector of the
economy  in  Estonia.  At  the  time  of the  crisis,  banking  intermediation  was  very  small  in
relation to the size of the real sector.  Industrial output and GDP  were still declining.  In all
likelihood, the banking crisis delayed the rebound  in output and limited its magnitude.  There
was no related budget crisis  as occurred  in Latvia and,  to some extent,  Lithuania.  Similarly,
there  was little  discernible political  impact of the banking crisis  as comparatively  few small
depositors  were  involved  (it came  at  an  early  phase  of  transition,  when  deposits  were  still
concentrated  in the Savings Bank) and there were  no associated scandals/corruption  associated
with government politicians.
5.3  Latvia:  The banking crisis  meant that the positive real growth expected for  1995--
projected to be 5%--was not attainable. The increasing tightness in liquidity, brought  about by
the  loss  of  deposits,  clearly  had  an  effect  in  1995 as  the  economy  registered  virtually  no
growth.  It is likely that the adverse wealth effects, coupled with the general effect on economic
confidence, will have subsequent negative effects on the economy.  In real  terms,  the money
supply declined by  17% during  the first five months of  1995.  Inflation abated on account of
the liquidity tightness while nominal interest rates began to increase after the middle of 1995,
leading  to  an  upturn  in  real  interest  rates.  The  net  international  reserves  of  the  BOLAT
declined from a peak of $466 million at the end of 1994 to $369 million at the end of June 1995
as the BOLAT intervened to maintain the Lat's parity vis-a-vis the Special Drawing Right.
5.4  A severe budgetary crisis emerged in Latvia in 1995 and has been exacerbated by the
banking crisis  in two ways.  First,  the lost liquidity of enterprises has reduced their ability to
pay  taxes.  The budget deficit that  had been expected to  be US$80  million for the whole of
1995 has  ballooned  to  about US$140  million,  or  about  3%  of  GDP.  Second,  the  fall  in
liquidity of the banking  sector at  large,  reflecting  the subsequent  reduction  in deposits  as  a
result of the banking crisis,  led to a fall in the demand for short-term Treasury  paper on the
part of  banks.  The  outstanding  stock  of  Treasury  bills fell  from  a  peak  of  about  US$115
million in early March to US$50 million at the end of June 1995.  Hence, the financing side of
the budget also became more problematic.
5.5  The  political  implications  of the  crises  were  severe.  The elections  at the end  of
September  1995 led to a rejection of the ruling centrist parties.  It was the centrist parties that
held the prime economic portfolios in recent coalition governments.  Furthermore,  it was these
18parties that were mostly associated with the banking collapse.  The parties at the extremes of
the political spectrum gained seats in the election,  some of which had  strongly criticized the
Government's performance in handling the banking crisis.  While the banking crisis  may not
have been the primary cause of a shift in voter sentiment, it was certainly a contributing factor
and an element in political campaigns.
5.6  Lithuania: As  in Latvia,  the banking crisis  and the concomitant economic fallout
have created budget difficulties in Lithuania.  While GDP and real income growth were both
projected to  be  around 4  percent  and  inflation was projected to  fall  to 20  percent from  37
percent in  1995, it now appears that these targets are unattainable as production and sales are
suffering  as  a  result  of  shortages  of  working  capital  experienced  by  affected  enterprise
depositors.'5 Before the crisis,  the fiscal deficit was planned to be Litai 700 million (US$175
million) or 1.8 percent of GDP, but these estimates will likely have to be revised upwards.
5.7  As a  result of  the disappearance of Innovation Bank as  a  source of  financing for
energy, the energy system's imbalances came into the open.  Unpaid debts to Russia's Gazprom
have  increased  sharply  (reportedly  to  reach  US$36  million  by  mid-March  1996)  leading
Gazprom to  reduce the quantity of gas  it supplied to Lithuania,  with threats to halt supplies
completely.  Faced with a  shrinking  resource envelope,  the Government was forced to take
action against Lithuanian consumers--primarily companies and budgetary organizations--which
had long-standing  payment arrears to  Lithuania's  energy system (reportedly  US$80 million
equivalent as of March 1996) but its efforts in this area have been modest and as a result energy
arrears continued to build.  As in Latvia, a sharp--but temporary--increase in interest rates took
place in the Treasury bill market.  The demand for Treasury bills fell abruptly but later quickly
recovered.
5.8  The political impact was quite dramatic in Lithuania. The crisis led to the fall of the
Government.  The subsequent void that emerged--with the resignation of the Prime Minister
and the Governor of BOLIT--slowed the attempt to find a solution to the problem.
Impact on the Banking Sector
5.9  The banking  crises  have  had  both  a  short-  and  long-run impact  on  the  three
banking systems under consideration.  In the short-run typically there has been a bleeding of
deposits from  the banking system as a  whole with some reallocation to  the banks  that are
either perceived to be the strongest or which have explicit insurance  attached to the deposits
(especially  some  state  banks).  In  the  longer-run--and here  the  Latvian  and  Estonian
experiences are only relevant-- the crises have helped to  stiffen  the resolve of  the banking
supervisors and encourage a healthy consolidation in the banking sectors.
5.10  Estonia:  The banking crisis  initially led to  some withdrawal of funds from the
banking system but this did not last, and confidence gradually returned.  In the longer-run, the
crisis has had a positive effect on the development of the sector.  The Authorities' tough stance
during this crisis led many banks to realize that they could not count on Government or central
15  Most of the depositors in the failed banks were corporate entities or budgetary organizations.  The bulk of retail deposits
is with the state banks and with the better private banks.
19bank  assistance,  and  that  any  assistance  would  be  at  a  large  cost  to  management  and
shareholders.
5.11  Another factor that was important was that a  "hard-budget constraint" also began to
he applied to other parts of the economy.  By midi-1993, the Ministry of Economy had begun
placing somile  of its state owned enterprises into bankruptcy, rather than bailing them out.  To
their shock, many of the banks, who had assumed that credits to state owned enterprises would
be honored by the Government if the enterprises could not pay, discovered that they had to wait
with  other creditors  for  their  share of  recovered  assets.  The  hard-budget constraint  in  the
enterprise sector, combined with the knowledge that bank bailouts would not be forthcoming,
led to much more cautiou  leInding  by m!ost  of the banks.
5.12  The Governnment  llow  owIns  the North Estonian Bank (which included the remnants
of the former Vneshieconomhbaik);  and the Bank of Estonia owns the Savings Bank.  The state
held only a minority stake in the other state banks.  The Government had not developed a clear
privatization program for  the banks, instead. the Government allowed its share in other  banks
(Industry  andi Construction,  Social Bank.  and  Agriculture  banks) to  be  diluted  through  the
issuance  of new sihares.  I'he Agriculture banks, which prior to the crisis,  had operated as 15
separate units, recombined, primarily  into 2 banks.  Lesti Maapank (the Estonian Land Bank)
and Uhispank (Union Bank).  Oiie agriculture baiank,  Rahva Bank retained its independence until
1995. when it mer-ged  with several other small banks.
5.13  The t'orimer  starte  banks hiave followed very different paths.  The Bank of Estonia
sold one-third of the Savings Bank to a private Estonian Bank, Hansapank.  Subsequently, a
new president of the bank was appoinited  who instituted sweeping changes, firing over 90% of
top management and more than 60% of middle management.  He aggressively wrote  off the
bank's loan losses and restr-uctured  the bank's operations.  In 1995, the EBRD purchased about
27%  of' the stock.  In addition,  emnployee  shar-e purclhase and domestic and foreign (private
placeinieniti  slhare issues havIe  ftUrthel  dilute(d the B3O1E's  share of the bank to about 30%/6. The
Savings Banik is  now ai  stable, profitable banlk,  and i: one of the largest banks in Estonia.
5.14  lthispaiik,  one  of the spin-offs from the Agriculture  Bank,  has also  successfully
moved from its original  structure.  It has diversified away from agriculture,  has also raised
money in both domestic and international markets, and has become the second largest bank in
Estonia.
5.15  The other Gosbank spin-off's have not been as successful.  The Social Bank was
eventually liquidated.  Eesti Maapank;  and  Rahvapank (the other Agriculture Bank spin-offs)
had difficulties restructuring and growing thehi client bases.  Since they could not meet the new
1996 minimuml capital  r  ecquiremiienits,  tihey were  mer-ged with  two other  small banks.  The
Industry and Construction Bank  is still independent, but is still seeking a profitable niche. The
North Estonian Bank is still in difficulty.
5. 16  Of the 25 private banks licensed before the crisis,  16 have been closed or merged.
However, several of the rcnaining  banks have become quiLe  important.  The largest bank in
Estonia is Hlansapank, which, at thie  time of the crisis was only the 8th largest bank.  Tallinna
2-0Bank and Foreks/Raepank are also significant players in the market (see Figure  la for changes
in market structure.  See also box 5).
Figure  la
Es-tonia: Bank Assets  (by bank) Dec.  1993 and Dec. 1995
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I  North  Estonian  Bank  12 EVEA  Bank
2  Estiiari Social Bank  1  3  Estonian  Industrial  Dev.
3  Estonian  Savings  Bank  14 Ralzabank-
4  Estonian Union Bank  I5  Nowebank
5  Hansapak  16 Estonian Innovation Bank
-6 Estonian  Industry  and  Co  17 K'eila  Rank
7  Estonian  Land  Bank  18 American  Baltic  Bank
8  ERA  Bank  19 Tatinna  Business  Hank;
9  Tallinna  Bank  20 Estonian  Forex  Bank
I lEstonian  Credit  Bank  21 RAE  Bank
II Virunmaa  Kommertsbank
5.17  The  top private  banks,  as well  as the  Savings  Bank and  Uhispank,  have  also  begun
expanding  their  activities  beyond  basic  deposit-taking  an(d lending  to encompass  areas  suchl as
securities  markets,  investment  management,  and  leasing.  'rhe  larger  Estonian  banks  are  now
looking  beyond  the  domestic  market;  Hansapank.  for  example,  has  just  announced  plains to
acquire a Latvian Bank.
5.18  Latvia:  It  might have been anticipated that the banking crisis  in  Latvia in  the
spring  of  1995  would  have  spilled  over  onto  the  surviving  banks.  presenting  them  with
potentially  serious  liquidity  pressures.  This  did  not  happen  initially.  In  fact,  between  the
beginning of  May and  the  beginning of July--the period  whein Bank Baltija was obviously
failing and was then declared insolvent--the top ten banks In the system, in aggregate, had an
increase in total deposits of 3.3 percent.5.19  However, during the month of July--just when the Baltija crisis was stabilizing--two
of the  large banks  began experiencing  serious  funding problems.  Indeed,  one  of the banks
sustained a decline in  total deposits  of 26  percent,  while  the other  had  a 20  percent  decline
compared  with  the  previous  month.  While  complete  information  on  these  events  is  not
available,  the loss of funding  in one case appears to  have been related to  the withdrawal  of
large interbank balances by Russian banks. In the other case, the bank seems to have been the
victim of unsubstantiated rumors regarding its solvency, which reportedly  led to the withdrawal
of deposits by some major Western European corporate depositors.  The fact that there was not
an even more widespread contamination of the banking sector can perhaps  be attributed to the
fact that the interbank market--a possible channel for contamination--accounted for only 6% of
total bank liabilities (at end-April).
5.20  Another concern has been the withdrawal of deposits from the Savings Bank which
took several months to stabilize.  This withdrawal has taken place in the form of a trickle rather
than a major run.  In some cases depositors who had lost funds in insolvent banks had to draw
down  funds  from  their  Savings  Bank  accounts  to  finance  their  immediate  needs.  The
withdrawals also appear to be associated with a general fall in confidence in the banking system
by household  depositors.  Whereas  enterprise  depositors  must  maintain a  deposit balance  in
order to consummate transactions,  the reaction of households facing uncertainty is to keep cash
in either  domestic  or  foreign currency.  A number  of other banks,  the stronger  ones  in the
system,  have,  however,  consistently  benefited  from  the  difficulties  elsewhere  in  the  sector.
Unibank,  for  instance,  has  consistently  gained  deposits.  As  in  Estonia,  there  has  been  a
significant change in the structure of the banking sector (see Figure  lb)  both directly as a result
of the banking crises  and as a response to the tighter  supervisory environment since that time.
(See also Box 5).
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5.21  Lithuania:  The  immediate  effect  of  the  banking  crisis  was  that  between  late
D)ecember 1995 and  early  February  1996, the  banking  system  lost  about  15 percent  of  its
deposit base in Litai,  while deposits in foreign currencies  fell by 19 percent.  The better  new
private banks, some of which were the subject of rumors that they would be next in line to fail,
had to resort to unusual steps such as publishing the size of their corresponding balances abroad
and remaining open on Saturdays to comfort panicky customers.  Panic withdrawals did not last
long,  however, possibly also as a result of the presence of the Government Guarantee scheme
for  inter-bank lending and  continued explicit deposit protection for  individual deposits  in the
state banks.  At the same time, the better new banks were also experiencing a notable increase
in their client base as the Government instructed all state enterprise and budgetary organization
clients of the failed banks to switch to other banks.  The build-up of funds in this new corporate
client base is likely to result in a relatively quick rebound of total banking sector deposits.  The
changing structure of the Lithuanian banking system is illustrated in Figure  1C.
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50 W  ~  ~  ~  2VI.  THE UNDERLYING CAUSES
6.1  In the embryonic banking  systems of the Baltics  it is difficult to  fully unravel  the
complex web of causes of the three banking crises.  What is clear,  however, is that a number of
systemic factors  have been at work and  these have put  pressure on  the solvency of  banks or
created adverse incentives for sound banking business.  Superimposed on these has been a number
of country and bank specific causes of banking  distress that were identified in chapter III.
6.2  The systemic factors can be categorized under four broad  headings: poor  regulation
and supervision; poor accounting and excessive taxation; an  inadequate legal infrastructure for
bank  lending;  and,  pervasive  corrupt  practices  coupled  with  weak  banking  skills  and
mismanagement on  a  significant  scale.  Finally,  the  stresses  and  strains  initiated  by  the
combination of transition  and stabilization exposed  the underlying weaknesses of some banks,
leading to their  failure  and distress.  To  some extent  the factors noted are interrelated.  For
instance,  the transition  environment has  unleashed significant profit  maximizing behavior  in
many  segments  of  society,  including  in  the  banking  industry.  While  much  of  it  reflects
entrepreneurial zest,  some  of  it spills  over  into  illegal and  unscrupulous activities.  In  some
instances it has been weaknesses in bank regulation and supervision that have created incentives
towards corrupt practices.
6.3  Banking  regulation and  supervision:  A contributory  factor  to  all three  banking
crises was a failure of banking regulation and supervision.  Banking regulation and supervision
in  developed  market  economies  has  always  been  difficult  in  the  sense  that  supervisors  are
constantly having to adapt to keep up with changes in the nature of banks and their operations.
Even then it is clear that a concerted effort to conceal fraudulent activity from supervisors can
go undetected for many years and only come to light when losses of unsustainable proportions
have arisen.  Good examples of this are the well publicized bankruptcies of BCCI and Barings
Bank in the U.K.  and the major losses encountered by Daiwa bank in the USA.  Efforts  have
been made  in  all  three  Baltic Republics  to  strengthen  the  legal,  regulatory  and  supervisory
frameworks  of  banking.  Box 6 describes  how these  frameworks  have  evolved  in the  three
countries.  It is clear that weaknesses in this area were contributory  factors in both the Latvian
and Lithuanian crises.  In the former case it was deficiencies in the framework itself at the time
of  the  crises  that  was  a  contributory  factor  although  there  were  some  weaknesses  in
implementation.  In the Lithuania case it was primarily  deficiencies in the implementation of
regulation--even  when the  supervisory  function had  identified problems  they  were  not  acted
upon.  In Estonia the legal, regulatory and supervisory framework was very underdeveloped at
the  time of  the crisis  but  it was  less  significant as  a  cause  of crisis  than  in  the other  two
countries.  What may be of particular importance is the signaling effect that strong supervisory
implementation can  have for  the banking  sector  in  an  environment  where  non-adherence  to
rules and regulations is widespread.
6.4  The licensing and  regulatory  regimes in  the three Republic did  not  discourage  the
entry  of  foreign  banks  into  the  local  banking  market.  BOLIT  may  nonetheless  have
discouraged foreign banks  from entering  the  local market.  Arguably  in  Estonia--where  nine
foreign banks have entered the market in recent years--banking discipline may have been more
quickly embedded in the system.
266.5  Accounting and taxation:  In all three countries, banks initially continued to use the
old Gosbank chart of account.  In Estonia,  banks were required to use IAS for the first time in
1995 although the better banks began using IAS in  1993.  In Latvia, the introduction of IAS
accounting and reporting requirements began in 1994.  It was, as noted above, the requirement
that banks present their  1994 IAS accounts to  BOLAT that in fact precipitated the crisis.  In
Lithuania, a number of changes in bank accounting rules  were introduced gradually over  the
last three years, but the bank accounting rules still deviate from IAS in a number of important
respects.  The absence of and unfamiliarity with IAS based accounting systems and rules has
made it more  difficult for  bank  managers,  shareholders and  supervisors alike  to  accurately
gauge the solvency and liquidity problems building up in individual banks.  Even though most
of the Baltic banks were quick to have international auditors undertake IAS audits, these audits
have  not  served  as  early  warning  signals  of  something wrong,  and  often  were  ignored
altogether by the supervisors.
6.6  Perhaps  more  importantly,  while  all  three  countries  have  moved  early  on  to
introduce loan-loss classification and provisioning rules,  in practice these rules were often not
really applied (i.e. loan loss provisions were not actually booked) as the tax rules did not allow
any deduction for loan loss provision expenses.  In the Baltics as in other FSU countries, the
distinction between supervisory and tax accounting was initially a completely unknown concept,
making it impossible for banks to actually book loan loss provisions.  While the better banks
nevertheless used  profit and  loss data after  hypothetical provisioning to  determine dividend
payouts (with the more corrupt ones actively using this  loophole to  drain funds out of their
banks through large dividend payouts out of non-existent profits--see below), all banks--prudent
and imprudent alike--were as a result of this deficiency in the tax regime taxed on the basis of
fictitious profits.  The problem was only rectified relatively late in the transition in Estonia and
in  Latvia.  Lithuania  introduced a  scheme  at  the  end  of  1994 for  the  phasing  in  of  tax
deductibility of loan loss provision over a three year period.
6.7  Legal infrastructure for bank lending:  a factor that was largely missing at an early
stage in the Baltics was the existence of  a  legal framework that supported bank  lending  in
general.  Absent was appropriate legislation relating to  bankruptcy and collateral.  Another
related deficiency was the absence of well-functioning property titles,  mortgage and  pledge
registers as well as,  more generally, a  market for  land and real  estate.  Another  important
omission in  the  legal framework was  the absence of  appropriate corporate  governance  and
accountability  provisions  for  banks,  specifying  the  duties  and  responsibilities  of  bank
shareholders,  supervising board  members  and managers.  This  allowed the shareholders to
manipulate supervisory board members and through them, managers to exclusively serve their
own  interests,  rather  than  the  latter  serving  the  interests  of  monitoring  and  scrutinizing
managers' behavior with a view to safeguarding the banks as financial institutions in the interest
of all parties concerned,  including in particular the depositors.  All  of these factors--most of
which have now been addressed or  are being addressed--contribute to  the riskiness of bank
lending.
27Box  5:  THE  LEGAL,  SUPERVISORY  &  ACCOUNTING  FRAMEWORK  FOR  BANKING  IN  THE
BALTICS
Banking  In December,  1994, a new Credit Instituions  The 1992  Commercial Banking  Law  In December 1994, Parliament  enacted  a new
Laws  Law was passed  by the Estonian  Parliament.  provided  the initial framework  for banking  in  Central  Banking  Law and a new Commercial
The  law is quite  comprehensive,  covering  bank  Latvia. However,  it contained  weak licensing  Banking Law.  Both of  these new  laws
activities,  licensing,  reporting,  and accounting.  requirements,  inadequate  connected  lending  represent  significant  improvements  over their
It also  lays out  basic  prudential  regulations  and  requirements,  no limitations  on investments  in  predecessors,  and  together  provide  a  good  legal
allows bank  supervisors  to  enforce these  real  estate  and  enterprise  shares,  no provisions  framework for the future  development  of the
regulations,  up to and including the right to  governing  the change  of control of an existing  Lithuanian banking system.  The  Central
place banks in moratoria or  liquidation,  if  bank,  and inadequate  authority  for the Bank  of  Banking Law gives  the BOLIT broad  authority
needed.  Latvia  to close  and  liquidate  a bank. The  Bank  to supervise  the banking  system,  including  the
of  Latvia also had a  lack of  enforcement  power to grant bank licenses  and determine
powers.  various prudential  standards,  such as capital
adequacy.
The October  1995  Lair on Credit Institutions
addressed  many  weaknesses  of the 1992  Law.  The Commercial Bankinig  Law authorizes  the
In  particular. it  gave the  BOLAT greater  BOLIT to establish  prudential  standards  that all
enforcement  powers and tighter control over  banks  must  meet.  These  standards  are  for the
connected lending.  All  banks must  now  most part adequate. However, the law does
conform  with IAS and minimum  shareholders' not  contain any limitation on  the aggregate
funds  must  be  greater  than  Lat 1 million.  amount  of a bank's connected  lending.. The
law endows  BOUAT  with a  broad array of
sanctions  that can be  employed  to preserve  the
soundness  of the banking  system.
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Accounting  Starting  in 1995,  all banks  were required  to use  In November  1993,  banks  were required  no  The  Banking  Law states  that  the HOLIT  sets
lAS.  In addition,  all banks  must  have  an  begin  to prepare  their  Annual  Financial  the  accounting  rules  for banks.  While the
internal  auditing  group,  and  all banks  must  Statements  in the same  format  as  EU banks.  BOU1T  has  made  some  progress  in the
have  their  annual  reports  audited  by  an  external  These  accounts  had  to be filed with the  Bank  of  introduction  of new  accounting  principles,  like
auditor  Latvia  by April 1. 1995.  Major banks  were  accrual  accounIting,  the  banks  essentially
required  no  have  an  lAS audit  starting  with the  continue  to use  a mandatory  chart  of account
1993  Financial  Accounts.  Under  the Law  on  which  is not  consistent  with LAS.  One
Credit  Institutions  all banks  must  comply  with  important  improvement,  however,  which  was
IAS. Since  December  1993  regulations  have  introduced  early on  (in December  1994)  was
been  issued  to bing accountng  and reporting  the enactment  of a scheme  for phasing  in the
standards  into line  with lAS.  Regulations  have  tax  deductibility  of loan-loss  provisions,  which
been  issued  on Annual  Account  Formats  (93),  adequately  balances  prudential  concerns  with
Loan  Loss  Provisioning  (931,  dividends  to  fiscal revenue  considerations.  This  scheme
shareholders  (931.  Accrual  Accounting  (95).  made  it possible  for banks  to actually  make
provisions  in accordance  with the  HOLIT's
,_______________  loan  classification  and  loan  provisioning  rule.
286.8  Corrupt practices and weak management:  In all three  of the Baltic economies
some  banks  were  created  as  captive  funding  mechanisms  by  groups  of  enterprises  and
individuals.  Underlying this type of activity was the fact that raising funds directly from the
public  was  cheaper  than  borrowing  from  banks.  Owners  and  managers  recognized  that
significant weakness in the banking laws pertaining to insider transitions allowed them to tap a
bank's  resources.  In other cases, owners and managers tried to achieve their short-run profit
goals by taking excessive risks within the bank,  often in the form of high risk lending, or by
assuming large open foreign exchange positions.  In these instances, the owners and managers
were undoubtedly encouraged by knowledge that the supervisory authority was inexperienced,
understaffed and lacked effective enforcement powers.  The lack of bank management skills,
coupled with generally weak banking skills among staff, led to poor decision making in banks.
6.9  Transition and Stabilization:  While it is vital for the structure (and infrastructure)
of  the economy  to adapt  to  the emerging  market  signals,  the process  of  transition  is not a
smooth one.  Entrepreneurs,  not used to functioning in a market context,  will make mistakes
in  the choice  of projects.  The nature  and  intensity  of competition  will also  not  be  clearly
defined in the earliest stages  of transition.  The transition  environment is,  therefore,  a very
risky  one  for  banks  to  be  operating  in,  particularly  as  the  legal  infrastructure  that usually
safeguards bank operations in developed market economies (e.g.  property rights and collateral
legislation, registration and enforcement) is not yet in place.
6.10  Not only is structural change taking place in the real sector but also in the banking
sector.  Banks--and indeed other financial institutions--are quickly evolving.  Rapid structural
change  is  not the most  propitious  background against  which  to  embed  sound techniques  of
banking.  A learning process has been underway for the last five years but invariably mistakes
will be made by inexperienced bankers.  In all three Baltic countries, the legal environment for
banking--governing  property  rights,  collateral,  bankruptcy,  etc.--has  not  been  supportive.
Hence, mistakes made cannot easily be rectified.
6.11  It has been the transitional process  that has exposed the weaknesses in the banks
and the regulatory environment for them.  The macro economic policy frameworks pursued in
all three Baltic Republics  as part of  the transition  has also  placed pressure  on the emerging
banking systems (see box 7).  The banks  and their  supervisors have been unable to monitor
and control  the risks inherent  in a policy environment where  a strong  stabilization has been
initiated.  These were the inevitable costs of a necessary economic policy.
6At a deeper  level there  was a belief  among  some bankers--a  result  of the liberation  from the era of state control--
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7.1  The banking crises in the three Baltic Republics share some common roots but they
have manifested themselves in different ways and  at slightly different times in the transition.
The  main  similarities  relate  to  the  broad  context  in  which  they  arose,  specifically  the
environment of simultaneous transition and adjustment which puts tremendous strain on banks
and  their  enterprise  borrowers  and  reveals  the  inherent  weakness  in  the  banks  and  their
regulations.  Another  similarity relates  to  the  factors internal to  the banks:  weaknesses in
management and in general banking skills.  A prominent cause internal to the banks was the
prevalence  of fraud  and  corruption.  This  had,  in  turn,  been encouraged  by  the  relatively
permissive regulatory and supervisory environment for banks that has existed in the Baltics but
which is now being progressively tightened.  Estonia and Latvia have progressed  furthest  in
this regard,  with Lithuania now lagging behind.  In all three counties the crises erupted in the
private banking sector (although a state bank was also involved in Estonia).  All three banking
crises  took many months to  brew but  were  "triggered"  by somewhat different  events.  The
banking  crises  in  Estonia and  Latvia have  led to  significant changes  in the  structure  of the
banking sectors  and a major  process of banking consolidation is now well underway.  There
are a number of conclusions --outlined below-- that can be drawn from the Baltic experience.
These could have  implications  for  the path of banking  reform  in the  rest  of  the FSU,  and
especially the smaller countries within that group.
7.2  Some Banking distress is inevitable:  Banking distress is inevitable in the countries
of  FSU  that  have  had  no  experience  of  market-based  banking  in  the  recent  past.  This
inevitably comes  from  the confluence of  risk  factors noted  in Chapters  III and  VI  that put
considerable pressure  on the fledgling banking sector.  However,  it also emanates from  some
of  the  structural  features  of  the  emerging  banking  systems,  particularly  the  existence  of a
plethora  of small,  poorly capitalized  banks that  are vulnerable because their capital is small
and they have not, because of their size, reaped the benefit of portfolio diversification.  Also,
new banks  are often too  small to afford  the  investment in banking  infrastructure  needed to
offer modern services. Similarly, the state-owned banks are invariably overstaffed, driving up
their  operating  costs  when  banking  salary  levels  adjust  to  the  higher  levels  in  the  private
banking segment.  This has been an additional factor  in driving banks to keep intermediation
margins high (the high risk nature of bank  lending being another major factor).  In turn,  the
high lending rates this has generated has further added to borrowers'  debt service difficulties.
7.3  Banking  distress  may  be  desirable:  The  risks  associated  with  lending  in
transitional economies combine to overwhelm many banks.  Furthermore,  the intensification of
bank  regulation--particularly  minimum capital  regulations  and  increasing  competition--force
these  banks  toward  merger  or  liquidation.  Banking  difficulties  therefore  emerge.  Such
difficulties are however  a common feature  of the structural  transition  of the banking  system
even though in specific cases it can create hardship for certain depositors.  They can lead to a
much needed consolidation of frequently overly-fragmented banking systems.
317.4  Banking crises relatively quickly die down:  while banking crises  erupt quickly,
they can equally quickly subside.  This reflects  in part the fact that depositors  in the Baltics
have come  to  expect  banking distress  to  take  place.  The  more  sophisticated  spread  their
deposits across many banks to diversify their risk.  Banking crises are quickly discounted as
evidenced by  the  sharp  rise  and  then  subsequent  sharp  falls  in  interest  rates following  the
crises in Latvia and Lithuania.  Moreover,  the three banking systems have shown resilience in
the face of the destabilization they have facecl.  In part this reflects the fact that each Republic
had a core of  solvent banks that  anchored the  system.  This  resilience  militates  in favor  of
banking authorities taking a tough stance in relation to problem banks.
7.5  The Authorities should respond firmly and promptly when banking crises arise:
Any support provided to banks in difficulty should be conditioned on stern action in the banks
concern (removal of managers,  loss of shares by existing owners).  Estonia clearly followed
this approach, sending a strong signal to its banks early on by openly stating there would be no
bank bailouts and by liquidating a privately-owned bank.  It later on softened its stance a little,
however,  when  the  NEB  ran  into  trouble;  this  bank- actually  has  received  significant
Government  support,  albeit  accompanied  by  appropriate  steps  to  improve  corporate
governance and lending prudence.  In Latvia,  although the Authorities clearly waited too long
to  intervene  in  Baltija.  the  policy  stance  vis-a-vis  the  provision  of  Government  support
subsequently evolved:  private banks would not he bailed out and the Authorities would only
take  responsibility  for  the  capital  deficiencies  of  the  state-ownled banks.  Also  in  Latvia,
regulation and supervision was notably tightened in response to the crisis.  In Lithuania, on
the other hand, the Authorities were faced with a more muddled bank ownership structure and
with the majority state-owned banks de facto being controlled by the new private shareholders.
Thus,  a clear-cut distinction between support for private and public banks could not be made.
Against  this  backgrounid the  Authorities  have  been  prepared  to  consider  budget  financed
recapitalization schemes.  Although it is still too early to say what solution will finally emerge
in  Lithuania,  possible  burden-sharing  scenarios  with  private  shareholders  are  now  under
discussion.  In practice it appears that political and fiscal pressures make it virtually impossible
for Authorities of transition economies to stick to either a full hands-off (Estonia) or hands-on
(Lithuania) approach.
7.6  Corruption  should  never  be  rewarded:  Banks  in  which  severe  fraud  and
corruption  is rife  should be  liquidated early  on before they  become  "too  big  to  fail",  their
shareholders should lose their  shareholding and all rights,  and managers should be  removed.
Banks that have a particular market niche and can be shown to be viable in the longer term can
in principle be restructured but only under new management and ownership, and provided they
have modest degrees of insolvency.
7.7  Banking  crises  should  be  prepared for:  While  banking  distress  is  inevitable,
banking crises should be avoidable if the banking supervision process is geared heavily toward
a very  close monitoring  of the largest banks that pose the greatest  risk  of creating systemic
problems.  This requires a  wvillingness  on the part of the Government to refrain from abusing
the banking sector for political and social lending purposes,  and to allow the bank supervisors
3?2to properly discipline the banking sector.  Failure to take prompt action when banking distress
is uncovered can lead to even greater losses in the longer-r-un.
7.8  Supervisors should  send strong  signals to  bankers  about appropriate  banking
behavior:  Heavy emphasis should be placed on tightening on- and off-site supervision  to such
an  extent  that  a  strong  signal  is  being  sent  to  bankers  about  the  number  of  penalties  for
inappropriate banking behavior.  Banking regulations should  not just  be  "on  the books"  but
should be applied forcefully.  The importance of this as a signaling device to bankers prone to
fraud and corruption should not be underestimated.  Signaling can play a very  important role
in  imposing discipline  in  banks  during  the  transition  years.  This  applies  not  only  to  the
intensity  of  supervision  but  also  to  the  Author-ities  appr-oach to  dealing  with  bankinig
difficulties when they arise-
7.9  Banking distress is likely to be a feature of transition in the FSU for several years to
come.  The  Authorities  in  these  countries  should,  therefore,  prepare  themselves  now--by
strengthening  their  supervisory  capacity  and  readying  themselves  for  tough  implementation
decisions--to deal with the inevitable.  Even if the  banking crises  materialize. they likely will
not have such severe effects on the economy as a crisis  of similar  proportions  in a Western
economy might have.  The banking and enterprise  sedlors in the FSU are not  so intimately
connected as they are  in the West.  Such crises  might in any case be  viewed as part of the
learning  component  of  transition.  If  the  lessons  are  proper-ly internalized by  enterprises,
banks, and supervisors, the long-term impact of banking crises can be positive.
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